Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect
Constitutional Rights
Adam S. Chilton† & Mila Versteeg††
Constitutional scholars have generally put faith in courts’ ability to improve
the protection of constitutional rights. While courts have limited means to enforce
their own decisions, the literature suggests that their decisions are implemented either when courts enjoy strong legitimacy or when they bring functional benefits to
other branches. In this Essay, we call this conventional wisdom into question. We
present data suggesting that the existence of independent courts does not increase
the probability that governments will respect constitutional rights. We outline four
reasons why this might be so. First, courts that too frequently obstruct the political
branches face court-curbing measures. Second, courts avoid high-profile clashes
with the political branches by employing various avoidance canons or deferral techniques. Third, courts protect themselves by issuing decisions that are mostly in line
with majoritarian preferences. Finally, courts are ill equipped to deal with certain
types of rights violations like torture and social rights. All these accounts offer a
potential explanation for why courts’ ability to enforce constitutional rights is more
limited than is commonly believed.

INTRODUCTION
In October 2015, Poland’s newly elected conservative government moved swiftly to neutralize the country’s Constitutional
Tribunal.1 After refusing to swear in the judges appointed by the
outgoing government, it amended the Law on the Constitutional
Tribunal to alter the court’s quorum requirements for reaching a
valid decision. When the constitutional court declared some of
these measures unconstitutional, the government simply refused
to publish its rulings. By now, the tribunal has fallen fully under
the government’s control.
This Polish constitutional blitzkrieg is one of the latest examples of a series of attacks on constitutional courts globally. In 2012,
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1
See Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and Constitutional Self-Defense (ICONnect, Dec 6, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/JC8P-QYTG. See also Joanna Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk,
Populism and Protest in Poland, 27 J Democracy 58, 62–63 (Oct 2016).
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Hungary’s right-wing government adopted a new constitution
that both allowed the government to pack the constitutional court
with government supporters and stripped the court of many of its
powers.2 Around that same time, the Council of Europe received
reports of death threats against Romanian judges and attacks on
their independence.3 In Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, new
governments stripped the constitutional courts of much of their
powers in the early 2000s after those courts had helped to oust
their respective authoritarian leaders.4 A decade earlier, the
Russian constitutional court lost a series of confrontations with
President Boris Yeltsin, leading to a shutdown and reconstitution
of the court just two years after it was established.5 Such incidents
are not confined to Eastern Europe: similar events have recently

2
See Stephen Gardbaum, Are Strong Constitutional Courts Always a Good Thing
for New Democracies?, 53 Colum J Transnatl L 285, 295–97 (2015).
3
See Neil Buckley, Judges Caught in Romania Power Struggle (Fin Times, Aug 7,
2012), online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/113332a2-e0af-11e1-8d0f-00144feab49a
.html#axzz40TxNtdGl (visited Aug 29, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
4
See Alexei Trochev, Fragmentation? Defection? Legitimacy? Explaining Judicial
Roles in Post-Communist “Colored Revolutions,” in Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein,
and Robert A. Kagan, eds, Consequential Courts: Judicial Roles in Global Perspective 67,
67–68 (Cambridge 2013).
5
See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional
Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 L
& Society Rev 117, 135–37 (2001).
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occurred in Sri Lanka,6 Egypt,7 Pakistan,8 and Turkey,9 among
other countries. Even courts in democracies with a strong tradition of judicial independence are not immune from attacks, as reports from Israel10 and South Africa11 reveal.
These developments are concerning because judges are typically seen as the main “guardians of the constitution”: the ones
who ensure that governments will not overstep their powers or

6
For example, in November 2012, the Sri Lankan parliament successfully impeached the chief justice of the supreme court after the court held that various parts of a
government’s controversial bill were inconsistent with the constitution. Accused of misuse
of power, the chief justice was removed from her office by the Sri Lankan president who
ignored a court of appeals’ decision finding the impeachment process illegal. Other judges
received threatening phone calls. See Sri Lanka: New Chief Justice Sworn In (NY Times,
Jan 15, 2013), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/world/asia/sri-lanka-new
-chief-justice-sworn-in.html (visited Dec 13, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable); Sri Lanka
Ruling Party MPs Move to Impeach Top Judge (Express Trib, Nov 1, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/46ZM-KNEQ; Hafeel Farisz and Dasun Rajapakshe, Appeal Court Judges
Get Threatening Calls (Daily Mirror, Jan 8, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/F4TB-TW7K.
7
In August 2012, in Egypt, the newly approved constitution reduced the size of the
Supreme Constitutional Court from nineteen to eleven members, retaining the ten longest
serving members and the chief justice. This was widely viewed as a political move to remove
the anti–Muslim Brotherhood justices, including the court’s only female member. See Jeffrey
Fleishman and Reem Abdellatif, Egypt President Mohamed Morsi Expands Authority in
Power Grab (LA Times, Nov 22, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/6ALA-43CF; Liliana
Mihaila, Why the Reduction in SCC Justices? (Daily News Egypt, Dec 24, 2012), online at
http://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/12/24/why-the-reduction-in-scc-justices/ (visited Dec 13,
2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
8
In the mid- to late 1990’s, after repeated clashes between Pakistan’s government
and the supreme court, then–Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto “aggressively sought to pack
the courts with judges regarded as loyal to her party’s interests—ignoring basic rules concerning qualifications for appointment and seniority-based conventions for elevating
judges, and further manipulating judicial composition by appointing ad hoc judges and
transferring judges between courts.” Anil Kalhan, “Gray Zone” Constitutionalism and the
Dilemma of Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 46 Vand J Transnatl L 1, 40 (2013). The
current Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, “proved no less aggressive, clashing with
the Supreme Court over appointments and other issues and later engaging in an ugly
effort to remove the chief justice, which culminated in a physical attack on the Supreme
Court building by a mob of Sharif’s supporters.” Id.
9
See Gulsen Solaker, Turkish Judge Defies Erdogan with Attack on ‘Dire’ Allegations (Reuters, Apr 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8N3V-6W4Q (describing the conflict between then–Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the constitutional court).
10 See Jonathan Lis, Kulanu Balks at Likud Demand to Weaken Israel’s Supreme
Court (Haaretz, Apr 21, 2015), online at http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium
-1.652811 (visited Oct 5, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing recent attempts
by the government to reduce the supreme court’s power and change the court’s appointment mechanism).
11 See Gardbaum, 53 Colum J Transnatl L at 298 (cited in note 2) (noting that
President Jacob Zuma described some of the constitutional court’s judges as “counter revolutionaries” and has asked for a review of the court’s power and an evaluation of whether
the court has stood in the way of socioeconomic transformation).
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encroach on citizens’ rights.12 Indeed, an independent judiciary,
equipped with the power of judicial review, has long been touted
as critical for the protection of constitutional rights. A common
view is that, although the presence of a constitutional right alone
may be insufficient to stop governments from later restricting
that right, courts provide a way for citizens to validate their
rights against the government.13 Courts serve this role primarily
by invalidating laws, regulations, and practices that violate constitutions’ rights protections.14 They can also reinterpret laws and
regulations so that they do not violate rights and can further
award compensation and other remedies to citizens whose rights
have been encroached on. Courts, then, are the primary defense
mechanism against rights encroachment. Indeed, scholars have
celebrated “rights revolutions” simply because courts have
started to enforce rights.15 Scholars have further argued that constitutional courts guard democracy itself; they facilitate transitions to democracy by providing insurance to potential political
losers16 and protect fragile democracies against one-party rule.17
The faith in courts is widespread not only in the academic
literature but also in policy circles. Organizations like the World
Bank and US Agency for International Development (USAID)

12 See Carl Schmitt, The Guardian of the Constitution ch I.1–3, in Lars Vinx, ed, The
Guardian of the Constitution: Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the Limits of Constitutional Law 79, 79–90 (Cambridge 2015) (Lars Vinx, trans).
13 See, for example, Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,
in Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Studies in Rationality and Social Change 195, 236–37 (Cambridge 1988); Daniel A. Farber, Rights as
Signals, 31 J Legal Stud 83, 92–93 (2002).
14 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121
Harv L Rev 1693, 1728–31 (2008).
15 See, for example, Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and
Supreme Courts in Comparative Perspective 7–8 (Chicago 1998) (noting that a “rights revolution” consists of “judicial attention to the new rights, judicial support for the new rights,
and implementation of the new rights” whereas implementation is “the extent to which
courts have issued a continuing stream of judicial decisions that enforce or elaborate on
earlier decisions”); David R. Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study
of Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment 7 (UBC 2012) (“Because of the
prominent role of courts in this process, the rights revolution is closely tied to constitutionalism and the judicialization of politics.”).
16 See Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in
Asian Cases 21–33 (Cambridge 2003) (“By ensuring that losers in the legislative arena
will be able to bring claims to court, judicial review lowers the cost of constitution
making and allows drafters to conclude constitutional bargains that would otherwise
be unobtainable.”).
17 See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts 132–36 (Cambridge 2015).
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have spent billions of dollars on strengthening judicial independence and capacity around the world, relying, at least in part, on
the assumption that functional, independent courts will enforce
rights.18 Indeed, the sweeping global expansion of judicial power,19
sometimes characterized as a “judicialization of politics,”20 has generally been met with approval from both scholars and policymakers.
Our research, however, suggests that the presence of independent courts alone might not be enough to stop a government
determined to curb its citizens’ rights. As part of a multiyear
research project, we have explored, through both quantitative
analysis and case studies, whether and how constitutional rights
guard against actual rights violations.21 One of the more puzzling
findings from our research is that constitutional rights do not appear to be better protected in countries with independent courts
equipped with the power of judicial review (which we refer to here
as “constitutional courts”).22 While there is a positive correlation
between judicial independence and respect for rights in general,
we do not find that countries with independent courts are better
at upholding their constitutional commitments than countries
without such courts.
In trying to make sense of this puzzle, we argue that rights
enforcement ultimately falls on citizens themselves. When citizens are organized, they can act strategically to resist rights encroachments through strikes, protests, civil disobedience, and mobilizing the political opposition, as well as litigation. Coordinating

18 See, for example, David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance:
Past, Present, and Future, in David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos, eds, The New Law and
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal 74, 74 (Cambridge 2006) (noting that the
World Bank has spent $2.9 billion on rule-of-law reforms since 1990).
19 See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism 1–3 (Harvard 2004) (describing the judicial empowerment that resulted
from the “sweeping worldwide convergence to constitutionalism”).
20 See C. Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power:
The Judicialization of Politics, in C. Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder, eds, The Global
Expansion of Judicial Power 1, 5–6 (NYU 1995).
21 See generally Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make
a Difference?, 60 Am J Polit Sci 575 (2016); Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg, The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions, 44 J Legal Stud 417 (2015); Adam S. Chilton
and Mila Versteeg, International Law, Constitutional Law, and Public Support for Torture, 3 Rsrch & Polit 1 (Jan–Mar 2016); Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg, Rights without Resources: The Impact of Constitutional Social Rights on Social Spending, J L &
Econ (forthcoming), archived at http://perma.cc/VV7C-TTGV; Adam S. Chilton, Maria
Smirnova, and Mila Versteeg, Constitutional Rights in Action; a Case Study on Religious
Freedom in Russia (unpublished manuscript).
22 See, for example, Chilton and Versteeg, 60 Am J Polit Sci at 584–85 (cited in note 21).
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such action, however, is not easy and is prone to coordination failure. In earlier work, we have argued that for some rights, it is
easier to overcome such collective-action problems because they
are practiced by and within formal organizations. 23 This is the
case for the right to unionize, which is practiced by trade unions
that mobilize for the protection of workers’ rights; for the right to
form political parties, which is practiced by political parties that
mobilize to protect the right of parties to participate in elections;
and for the freedom of religion, which is typically practiced within
religious organizations that can take actions to protect religious
freedom. Indeed, our statistical analysis reveals that the right to
unionize, the right to form political parties, and the freedom of
religion are associated with better rights practices.24 Based on
case studies in Tunisia, Myanmar, and Russia, we have found
evidence that these rights become self-enforcing because of the
enforcement actions taken by trade unions, political parties, and
religious groups. For individual rights—such as free speech or the
prohibition of torture—such enforcement cannot be taken for
granted, because mobilization is prone to coordination failure.25
Importantly, when organized groups of citizens mobilize to protect rights, litigation is merely one of the available tools to protect
their interests. For example, our case study on religious freedom
in Russia reveals that religious groups have mobilized to protect
religious freedom by lobbying sympathetic lawmakers, circulating petitions, engaging in public discourse, and organizing education campaigns, in addition to resorting to litigation.26 Courts,
then, are merely one of the defense mechanisms against rights
encroachments, and perhaps not even the most important one.
Our goal in this Essay is to present some of the global data
on the relationship between independent constitutional courts
and constitutional-rights enforcement and to set forth some explanations for why courts might be less powerful than is commonly assumed. The remainder of this Essay unfolds as follows.
Part I reviews the two main theoretical accounts for how and why
courts might be able to enforce rights. Part II presents data suggesting that independent courts do not increase the protection of
constitutional rights. The statistical analysis that underlies our

23
24
25
26

See id.
See id at 582–84.
See id.
Chilton, Smirnova, and Versteeg, Constitutional Rights in Action (cited in note 21).
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ultimate conclusion is available in the Appendix.27 Part III explores limitations inherent in judicial review that may explain
why judicial review does not appear to have improved protections
of constitutional rights.
I. THEORIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: LEGITIMACY AND
FUNCTIONAL BENEFITS
The finding that independent courts are often powerless to
enforce the constitution against overbearing governments might
come as a surprise to many. When confronted with the puzzle of
why political actors would obey the constitution’s constraints on
their power, legal scholars and practitioners are often quick to
point to the judicial branch.28 The president and Congress will ultimately refrain from taking unconstitutional actions because
courts strike down laws and regulations that contradict the constitution, or so the argument goes.
It is not obvious, however, that courts should be successful in
enforcing rights against the government. One of the fundamental
features of constitutional law is that it lacks an external, super–
state enforcement authority capable of coercing political actors to
comply with the constitution.29 When it comes to ordinary law—
such as codes, statutes, and other rules that apply to private actors within a state—the state is the source of law, and it has
power to enforce it against its private subjects.30 In constitutional
law, however, the state is not only the source of law, but also its
subject, meaning that the only actor empowered to enforce law
against the state is the state itself.31

27 Similar results will further feature in our forthcoming book manuscript and have
partly been featured in our peer-reviewed publications.
28 See Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 Harv L Rev 1791, 1830–31 (2009) (observing that constitutional scholars rarely ask why the constitution is complied with, and that “[w]hen such
questions are raised . . . the answers tend to begin and end with judicial review”).
29 See id at 1795. See also Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions
as Coordinating Devices, in Sebastian Galiani and Itai Sened, eds, Institutions, Property
Rights, and Economic Growth: The Legacy of Douglass North 121, 122 (Cambridge 2014);
Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution? (“Why a Constitution? (2013)”), in Denis J. Galligan
and Mila Versteeg, eds, Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions 51, 53, 65–66
(Cambridge 2013); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657, 662 (2011); Martin Shapiro, The European
Court of Justice: Of Institutions and Democracy, 32 Isr L Rev 3, 8 (1998).
30 See Goldsmith and Levinson, 122 Harv L Rev at 1795–96 (cited in note 28).
31 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 364 (Legal Classics
1984) (originally published 1832) (noting that “without men to enforce them,” constitutions
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The same is true for judicial decisions enforcing the constitution.32 As Alexander Hamilton famously observed, the judiciary
lacks “influence over either the sword or the purse.”33 The judiciary ultimately depends on the executive branch to enforce its rulings. The executive branch may not always be inclined to do so,
especially when the executive’s own actions are at issue. To illustrate, consider President Andrew Jackson’s (likely apocryphal) reaction to the Supreme Court’s Worcester v Georgia34 decision:
“Well, John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce
it!”35 As this statement illustrates, it is not obvious that governments will respect judicial rulings that curb their power.
There are two main explanations in the literature for how the
judiciary can enforce constitutional rights even when the political
branches dislike the judicial decision. The first set of explanations—legitimacy theories—holds that courts can do so when they
enjoy high levels of legitimacy as an institution. The second set of
explanations—functional theories—suggests that independent
courts, equipped with the power of judicial review, bring important functional benefits, such as aiding coordination and
providing focal points, that outweigh the costs of complying with
occasional unfavorable rulings.
A.

Legitimacy Theories

A line of research has argued that constitutional court decisions are complied with because of the courts’ legitimacy.36 The
are “merely idle words scribbled on paper or parchment”); Frederick Schauer, The Force
of Law 89–92 (Harvard 2015).
32 See Dieter Grimm, Judicial Activism, in Robert Badinter and Stephen Breyer, eds,
Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An International Conversation 17, 26 (NYU 2004)
(“It is the specific weakness of constitutional courts that the power is in the hands of those
who are affected by their decisions.”).
33 Federalist 78 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 521, 522–23 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob
E. Cooke, ed) (deeming the judiciary the “least dangerous” branch).
34 31 US 515 (1832).
35 See Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Powers of Law: Theories and Limits 58
(Harvard 2015).
36 See, for example, David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life 267–68
(Chicago 1979); David Easton, A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support, 5 British J Polit Sci 435, 450–53 (1975); James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court
of Justice, 39 Am J Polit Sci 459, 461 (1995); James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and
Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 Am Polit Sci Rev 343,
344–46 (1998); Richard H. Fallon Jr, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv L Rev
1787, 1794–96 (2005). Recent work by Professors Tom Ginsburg and Nuno Garoupa conceptualizes some of these same ideas as judicial reputation. See Nuno Garoupa and Tom
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idea is that courts can draw on what Professor David Easton
called “diffuse support”—that is, “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will” toward the institution—“that helps members
to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed.”37 High
levels of diffuse support, or legitimacy, can mitigate dissatisfaction with unpopular opinions.38 Thus, when a court is perceived
as legitimate, its decisions are more likely to be complied with,
regardless of the support for the decision itself.
Legitimacy is something that courts build over time. In a
study of the high courts of eighteen EU member states, Professors
James Gibson, Gregory Caldeira, and Vanessa Baird find that
building legitimacy requires gaining support among successive,
nonoverlapping constituencies.39 If courts always favored the
same groups, however, they would not be perceived as legitimate.40 For example, Professor Heinz Klug has argued that the
South African constitutional court’s initial success can be explained by the fact that it favored different constituencies, striking down old apartheid legislation and newer African National
Congress (ANC) laws alike.41 Legal scholars have further suggested that legitimacy can be built through legal techniques such
as precedent-based reasoning, “investing rhetorical effort in
maintaining neutrality,” and carefully crafting decisions so that

Ginsburg, Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory 14–23 (Chicago 2015). There is a
related strand of research, tracing back to Max Weber, that deals with the legitimacy of
law more broadly, which we set aside here. There is also a strand of legitimacy theory that
is more normative in character. See generally, for example, Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental
Law?, 93 Am J Intl L 596 (1999). There are also studies focused on procedural legitimacy.
See generally, for example, Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective
Rule of Law, 30 Crime & Just 283 (2003).
37 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life at 273 (cited in note 36). See also
Easton, 5 British J Polit Sci at 444 (cited in note 36).
38 This distinction is used by most political science accounts on legitimacy. See, for
example, Gibson and Caldeira, 39 Am J Polit Sci at 474–76 (cited in note 36); Gregory A.
Caldeira and James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice in the European
Union: Models of Institutional Support, 89 Am Polit Sci Rev 356, 365–67 (1995); Gibson,
Caldeira, and Baird, 92 Am Polit Sci Rev at 348–52 (cited in note 36); Yonatan Lupu,
International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National Courts, 14 Theoretical Inquiries
L 437, 440–45 (2013).
39 See Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird, 92 Am Polit Sci Rev at 354–55 (cited in note 36).
40 See Shapiro, 32 Isr L Rev at 11 (cited in note 29) (suggesting that a court that
“consistently favors some of the power holders over others” will not be seen as neutral,
which might undermine its success).
41 See Heinz Klug, Constitutional Authority and Judicial Pragmatism: Politics and
Law in the Evolution of South Africa’s Constitutional Court, in Kapiszweski, Silverstein,
and Kagan, eds, Consequential Courts 93, 109–12 (cited in note 4).
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they appear to be based on legal reasoning alone.42 Courts can
further use various techniques to avoid high-profile clashes with
the political branches that have the potential to undermine their
legitimacy.
Of course, tension may arise from courts’ desire to issue wellreasoned decisions, on one hand, and distributing legal victories
evenly, on the other. It is unclear to what extent these two phenomena respectively impact judicial legitimacy. Regardless, the
lesson of the legitimacy view is that when stakeholders view the
court as the rightful arbiter of constitutional rights, it adds to the
court’s reservoir of good will and favorable attitudes. When there
is widespread support for the institution as a whole, this increases the likelihood that the government will comply with adverse decisions or else the government itself will lose popularity
and may face electoral consequences.
By its nature, legitimacy is usually acquired slowly and easily diminished. A court that frequently appears to disfavor one
side—especially when that side is the government—can quickly
lose legitimacy. When its legitimacy is depleted, a court may find
that decisions that lack specific support are simply not enforced.
The court might also witness various other forms of backlash,
such as court packing, a change in judicial appointment procedures, or other strategies to curb the court’s independence. We
return to this point in Part III.
B.

Functional Theories

A second set of explanations focuses on the functional utility
of courts. Perhaps the best-known functional theory emphasizes
courts’ ability to clarify law and to provide focal points for coordination.43 For example, a well-functioning government needs to coordinate on a set of rules on how to elect the president, how many
deputies to elect to parliament, how to divide power between the
national government and subnational units, and where to place

42 See Fallon, 118 Harv L Rev at 1840–41 (cited in note 36). See also Philip Bobbitt,
Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 5, 234–35 (Oxford 1982) (suggesting different styles of constitutional argument that can improve legitimacy); Shapiro, 32 Isr L Rev
at 9 (cited in note 29).
43 See Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 85–140 (Oxford
1999); Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution? (“Why a Constitution? (1989)”), in Bernard
Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds, The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism 100,
102 (Agathon 1989); Hardin, Why a Constitution? (2013) at 59–62 (cited in note 29).
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the capital city.44 While the initial task of coordinating these rules
falls on the constitution itself, the judiciary can further aid coordination by clarifying the rules and announcing when political actors have overstepped their powers. Thus, courts supply focal
points that increase stability and predictability.45
It is because of the benefits derived from the supply of focal
points that governments comply with judicial decisions they do
not like. As Professor Russell Hardin notes, supporters of presidential candidate Al Gore ultimately acquiesced in the Bush v
Gore46 Supreme Court decision because, even though they (and a
majority of the electorate) had chosen Gore, people feared that
undermining the Court might foster the sort of political crisis
that, in other times and places, has led to unrest, disorder, and
even violence.47 Thus, the long-term benefits of having rules by
which to play the political game, and the existence of a final arbiter to police these rules, may outweigh the short-term costs of unfavorable decisions.48
Notably, these coordination benefits are more relevant to
structural issues than rights, as it is the day-to-day operation of
government in which coordination is needed most.49 Constitutional rights, by contrast, do not typically solve coordination problems; this raises the question of whether the coordination-based
explanation for compliance extends to judicial decisions that enforce the constitution’s rights provisions.50 Yet, constitution writers do not generally give courts jurisdiction over structure alone.
Today, it has become almost unimaginable to draft a constitution
that does not include a bill of rights.51 Because political actors
44 See Hardin, Why a Constitution? (1989) at 101 (cited in note 43) (noting that a
constitution “establishes conventions” that “make it easier for us to cooperate and to
coordinate”).
45 McAdams, The Expressive Powers of Law at 119–35 (cited at note 35).
46 531 US 98 (2000) (per curiam).
47 See Hardin, Why a Constitution? (2013) at 57–58 (cited in note 29). Others have
explained compliance with this same decision based on the court’s legitimacy. See generally James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, and Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People
Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 Polit Rsrch Q 187 (2005).
48 See Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 710–11 (cited in note 29).
49 See Shapiro, 32 Isr L Rev at 22–23 (cited in note 29).
50 See id at 23 (noting that, unlike for the separation of powers, in the realm of constitutional rights, the “contract does not enforce itself” but courts “must enforce it against
powerful, united, majority forces”).
51 See David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99 Cal L Rev 1163, 1200–02 (2011) (presenting a list of rights provided by
a large majority of constitutions).
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value an independent court to interpret the constitution’s structural rules, those actors are also willing to comply with a certain
number of rights-related and other rulings that might not serve
their short-term interests.52 Although some of those decisions impose costs on the political branches, general compliance is less
costly than piecemeal noncompliance, because such ad hoc noncompliance would undermine the courts’ ability to provide valuable clarity on important governance rules.53 This logic suggests
that courts might be able to enforce rights at least occasionally,
as long as the costs of such decisions do not outweigh the benefits
of having a neutral arbiter that supplies focal points.
There are other functional benefits that can flow from having
an independent constitutional court. Professor Tamir Moustafa
argues that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat created an independent constitutional court to attract foreign investors, and that
until recently, the Egyptian government complied with the court’s
decisions in order to reap the long-term benefits of foreign investment.54 Similarly, Professor Martin Shapiro notes that the
Constitutional Court of Italy owes its success to the fact that it
was established as a case-by-case defascification tribunal when
the Italian legislature, after World War II, was unable to remove
fascist elements from the Italian legal system wholesale.55 It was
because of this larger function of the court that the Italian government complied also with those rulings it did not like. Likewise,
Professor Tom Ginsburg has suggested that compliance with constitutional decisions occurs because courts are established as a
form of political insurance to protect interests of political losers,
and those in power are aware that they themselves might need
such protection in the future.56 What these accounts share in common is that they emphasize that the functional benefits associated with having a court might outweigh the costs of complying
with occasional unfavorable rulings. Regardless of the exact
52 See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 Georgetown
L J 723, 757–59 (2009) (describing court adjudication as a means of avoiding conflict and
solving coordination problems).
53 See Hardin, Why a Constitution? (2013) at 57–58 (cited in note 29).
54 See Tamir Moustafa, The Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and
Economic Development in Egypt 6 (Cambridge 2007). See also Douglass C. North and
Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J Econ Hist 803, 816–23 (1989)
(suggesting that credible constitutional commitments to protect private property allow
governments to access capital).
55 Shapiro, 32 Isr L Rev at 4–5 (cited in note 29).
56 See Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies at 21–33 (cited in note 16).
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mechanisms, these various accounts suggest that the judiciary
might have the power to turn constitutional rights into something
more than mere parchment barriers because having a court is valuable to those in power.
Just like legitimacy can be depleted, functional benefits can
lose their value. When courts too frequently obstruct the political
process, the costs of complying with judicial decisions might outweigh the functional benefits provided by the court. The possibility of backlash is particularly salient when the court issues many
unfavorable rulings based on the bill of rights, for which there are
fewer coordination benefits to begin with. In such cases, courts
may find their jurisdiction stripped or their decisions overturned
by constitutional amendment. We also return to this issue in
Part III.57
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Although the legitimacy and functional theories may have
appeal, a systematic analysis of the available quantitative data
reveals little support for the idea that courts improve compliance
with constitutional rights. In this Part, we briefly describe other
scholars’ empirical research on the impact of constitutional courts
on the protection of constitutional rights and then present some
of our own data and empirical results on the subject.
A.

Prior Literature

We are not the first to explore the ability of courts to affect
constitutional-rights enforcement. Setting aside normative and
doctrinal work, which often takes this ability for granted, the
question has been addressed in both the qualitative comparative
constitutional law literature and in a handful of prior quantitative studies.
The bulk of the comparative constitutional law literature has
been quite bullish on the ability of courts to enforce constitutional
rights.58 Comparative constitutional scholars have marveled at
high-profile human-rights decisions from courts around the world
and analyzed such cases extensively in both academic articles and

57

For a discussion of court curbing, see notes 80–94 and accompanying text.
See Gardbaum, 53 Colum J Transnatl L at 294 (cited in note 2) (characterizing the
mood on constitutional courts as “bullish”).
58
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textbooks.59 Two features of the comparative literature are worth
noting. First, studies tend to focus on a handful of countries with
active and powerful courts, such as Hungary (prior to the rise of
the Fidez government), South Africa, Colombia, and India.60 This
focus has the potential to skew our impression on courts’ impact.
Indeed, cases in which courts have their wings clipped or lack independence entirely are rarely analyzed.61
Second, many of these studies take high-profile constitutional court cases as evidence that constitutional courts are making a difference. One example is Professor Charles Epp’s classic
work on rights revolutions. Epp contends that a “rights revolution” has the following conditions: constitutional rights, constitutional courts, rights consciousness, and a legal support structure
for mobilization comprising lawyers and organizations that bring
cases.62 However, Epp does not inquire whether high-profile judicial decisions actually impact rights on the ground. Many other
studies work from the same assumptions.63
Relatively few studies have explored the transformative effect of judicial decisions themselves. The ones that do tend to be
less optimistic about courts’ ability to enforce rights than those
who treat judicial decisions as the dependent variable. Professor
Gerald Rosenberg’s famous study of the ability of US Supreme
Court to bring about social change is an illustration.64 Rosenberg
shows that, while the US Supreme Court has issued a number of
important rights-protecting decisions, many such decisions were
ignored or had limited impact. Another important study on socialrights enforcement finds that constitutions’ social-rights provisions are increasingly enforced by courts in Latin America, but
that their transformative impact is limited.65 Specifically, based

59 See, for example, Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Z. Huq, and Mila Versteeg, The Coming
Demise of Liberal Constitutionalism?, 85 U Chi L Rev 239, 253–54 (2018).
60 See, for example, David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53
Harv Intl L J 189, 192 (2012) (discussing, among other countries, Hungary, South Africa,
Colombia, and India).
61 For a critique on case selection in comparative constitutional law, see generally
Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 Am J
Comp L 125 (2005). See also Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law 224–67 (Oxford 2014).
62 See Epp, The Rights Revolution at 11–20 (cited in note 15).
63 See, for example, Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution at 119–20 (cited in
note 15).
64 See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? (Chicago 2d ed 2008).
65 See Landau, 53 Harv Intl L J at 192 (cited in note 60).
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on an in-depth study of Colombia, Professor David Landau finds
that judicial enforcement of social rights tends to direct resources
toward higher-income groups that can afford to go to court, and
thus the decisions fail to improve the lives of the poor.66
There are also a handful of quantitative studies that explore
courts’ ability to enforce constitutional rights, although none have
explored the question thoroughly. Most of the relevant quantitative empirical literature has focused on the correlation between
courts and rights protections generally. More specifically, studies
in both economics and political science have found that countries
that have independent courts tend to have more respect for rights,
including property rights67 and a range of individual rights.68
Economists have further suggested that independent courts can
bring about economic growth.69
Only a handful of studies have directly explored courts’ ability to enforce constitutional-rights provisions—rather than to
document a general correlation between courts and rights—using
quantitative methods. An early study by Professor Frank Cross
of a cross section of fifty-three countries found that independent

66

See id at 202–03.
See, for example, Rafael La Porta, et al, Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J Polit
Economy 445, 449 (2004).
68 See, for example, M. Rodwan Abouharb, Laura P. Moyer, and Megan Schmidt, De
Facto Judicial Independence and Physical Integrity Rights, 12 J Hum Rts 367, 383 (2013)
(finding that higher levels of judicial independence are “associated with improved government respect for physical integrity rights”); Charles Crabtree and Michael J. Nelson, New
Evidence for a Positive Relationship between De Facto Judicial Independence and State
Respect for Empowerment Rights, 61 Intl Stud Q 210, 217 (2017) (finding that an independent judiciary is associated with the protection of “empowerment rights”); Frank B.
Cross, The Relevance of Law in Human Rights Protection, 19 Intl Rev L & Econ 87, 94–96
(1999) (finding that judicial independence is associated with greater political rights and
protection against unreasonable search and seizure); Linda Camp Keith, Judicial Independence and Human Rights Protection around the World, 85 Judicature 195, 200 (2002)
(finding that some formal constitutional guarantees for judicial independence are associated with better rights protections); Linda Camp Keith, C. Neal Tate, and Steven C. Poe,
Is the Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Rights Abuse?, 71 J Polit 644, 658 (2009) (finding
that “pursuing better human rights through constitutional law making” can lead to better
human-rights outcomes); Emilia Justyna Powell and Jeffrey K. Staton, Domestic Judicial
Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation, 53 Intl Stud Q 149, 167 (2009) (finding
that effective legal systems are associated with lower rates of human-rights abuse). But
see Courtenay Ryals Conrad and Will H. Moore, What Stops the Torture?, 54 Am J Polit
Sci 459, 464 (2010) (finding that judicial independence does not increase the probability
that a “torture spell” will end).
69 See North and Weingast, 49 J Econ Hist at 815–19 (cited in note 54).
67
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courts did not increase the enforcement of constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizures.70 In a more comprehensive study, James Melton suggests that constitutional protection of the freedom of expression, association, and movement
impact actual respect for these rights in authoritarian regimes
with high levels of judicial independence (although there are
very few of such regimes).71 Most recently, Charles Crabtree and
Professor Michael Nelson have found that the presence of independent courts actually decreases the impact of some constitutional rights and has no significant effect for others.72
Importantly, in none of these papers is the impact of independent judicial review on constitutional-rights enforcement the
main object of enquiry. In the remainder of this Part, we will provide an impression of our overall findings by presenting descriptive data. Full results using statistical methods are available in
the Appendix.
B.

Data

To explore the relationship between judicial review and
constitutional-rights enforcement, we first need data on
constitutional-rights protections and actual respect for those
rights in practice. We focus on nine constitutional rights: (1) the
right to unionize (“Unionization”); (2) the right to form political
parties (“Political Parties”); (3) the freedom of religion (“Religion”); (4) the right to gender equality (“Gender Equality”); (5) the
prohibition of torture (“Torture”); (6) the freedom of expression
(“Expression”); (7) the freedom of movement (“Movement”);
(8) the right to education (“Education”); (9) the right to healthcare
(“Health”). We choose these rights for a combination of substantive and practical reasons. The primary substantive reasons are
that we wanted to explore rights that are substantively important, cover a wide range of issue areas, and include a number
of different kinds of rights (including both civil and political rights
and social and economic rights; and including both rights that are
practiced within organizations and rights that are practiced individually). The primary practical reason is that we wanted to focus
70 See Cross, 19 Intl Rev L & Econ at 96 (cited in note 68). Cross did find, however,
that judicial independence was more impactful in countries without constitutional protections. Id at 96–97.
71 See James Melton, Do Constitutional Rights Matter? *23–24 (unpublished manuscript, Sept 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YGY2-GS8L.
72 See Crabtree and Nelson, 61 Intl Stud Q at 221 (cited in note 68) (Table 7).
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on rights for which there are time series data on the protection of
those rights over time.
Figure 1 depicts the prevalence of these rights in the world’s
constitutions from 1946 to 2010. All twelve rights are more common in 2010 than they were in 1946, but there is considerable
variation in the current prevalence of these rights. This ranges
from just 46 percent of countries that have a right to gender
equality to 97 percent of countries that have a constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression.
FIGURE 1. PERCENT OF COUNTRIES WITH RIGHTS IN THEIR
CONSTITUTIONS
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To explore their impact, we match each of these twelve constitutional rights (de jure rights) to a measure of human-rights
outcomes (de facto rights) within the country. These measures,
which are based on the annual country reports from Amnesty
International and the US State Department, have all been used
in prior research on human-rights outcomes, including our own.73

73 See, for example, Chilton and Versteeg, 60 Am J Polit Sci at 580 (cited in note 21)
(using the CIRI data set, which uses data from US State Department reports, to score
countries’ de facto human-rights practices); Chilton and Versteeg, 44 J Legal Stud at 424–
25 (cited in note 21) (using the CIRI data set, which uses data from US State Department
and Amnesty International reports, to score countries’ torture practices); Chilton and
Versteeg, Rights without Resources at *12 (cited in note 21).
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For social rights, our measures of de facto rights variables are
measures of social spending by the government. Table 1 lists the
dependent variable we use to measure the effectiveness of each of
the constitutional rights.
TABLE 1. DE JURE RIGHTS AND DE FACTO MEASURES OF RIGHTS
OUTCOMES
De Jure Right

De Facto Measure

Source

Unionization

worker: de facto respect for the right to
strike/unionize.
elecsd: de facto respect for right to form
political parties.
new_relfre: de facto respect for freedom
of religion.
hgi_ame: Historical Gender Equality
Index, which is a composite indicator
that includes information on gender inequality in women’s life expectancy, marriage age ratio, seats in parliament,
years of schooling, and labor force participation, among other things.
latentmean: latent measure of repression.
speech: de facto respect for freedom of
press/expression.
dommov: de facto respect for freedom of
movement.
spending_edu: percentage of GDP spent
on education.
spending_health: percentage of GDP
spent on healthcare.

CIRI

Political Parties
Religion
Gender Equality

Torture
Expression
Movement
Education
Health

C.

CIRI
CIRI
Dilli, et al
(2014)

Fariss (2014)
CIRI
CIRI
World Bank
World Bank

Descriptive Exploration

Using these data, we explore whether independent judicial review improves the protection of constitutional rights. In Figure 2,
the left panel depicts the average de facto rights measure for
countries with and without the right in their constitution. As
Figure 2 shows, countries with constitutional rights do not have
noticeably better human-rights outcomes. Figure 2 reveals that
the freedom of religion might be a noticeable exception. In a more
systematic statistical analysis in which we control for a range of
confounding factors, we find that religious freedom, the right to
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form political parties, and the right to unionize, are each associated with better rights practices.74 Interestingly, all these rights
are organizational rights, meaning that they are practiced within
organizations (organized religion, political parties, and trade unions). In our previous work, we have argued that their organizational character might render them self-enforcing because of the
enforcement actions that religious groups, political parties, and
trade unions can initiate.75

74
75

See Appendix A.
See Chilton and Versteeg, 60 Am J Polit Sci at 577–79 (cited in note 21).
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FIGURE 2. EFFECT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ON RIGHTS
OUTCOMES
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We next explore whether this relationship between de jure
and de facto rights is different in countries that have an independent judiciary equipped with the power of judicial review (a
“Constitutional Court”). The right panel of Figure 2 presents the
same graphs, but this time only for countries that have independent constitutional courts. We consider a country to have an independent constitutional court if: (1) the country is coded as having
an independent judiciary by the widely used CIRI measure of judicial independence developed by Professors David Cingranelli,
David Richards, and K. Chad Clay;76 and (2) we coded the country
as having judicial review of its constitution.77 As Figure 2 shows,
countries that meet these conditions do not have substantially
better rights outcomes than countries that do not meet them. Although there is substantial movement in the lines for countries
without constitutional rights and constitutional courts in a few of
the graphs, this is largely the case when there are very few countries with constitutional courts without the right (for example,
freedom of expression).
Although these results are merely exploratory and do not control for a range of relevant factors that can influence rights outcomes, they provide suggestive evidence that simply having an
independent constitutional court does not automatically mean
that a constitutional right is more likely to be respected in practice. In the Appendix, we use a range of statistical models and
control for confounding factors. In our preferred specifications, reported in Appendix A, we do not find that the interaction between
having any of these constitutional rights and an independent constitutional court is positive and statistically significant (the interaction between the freedom of movement and having a court is
statistically significant but negative). In some of our robustness
checks, we find a few instances of a positive interaction (for religion, torture, and speech), but these are not robust to alternative
specifications. In general, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that there is no effect.78
76 The CIRI data on judicial review is based primarily on the US State Department’s
assessment of judicial independence around the world. We code countries as having “Independent Judicial Review” if they score “2” for the CIRI measure injud.
77 We coded these data ourselves. For an exploration of what constitutes judicial review of constitutions, see Tom Ginsburg and Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional Review?, 30 J L, Econ & Org 587, 600–02 (2014). We added Israel and the
United States as having judicial review even though the Israeli constitution is ambiguous
and the US Constitution contains no explicit reference to constitutional review.
78 See Appendix A.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ LIMITATIONS
How is it possible that courts’ impact on constitutional-rights
enforcement is so limited? Both the legitimacy and functional
theories suggest important explanations for why court decisions
could matter. But they also reveal inherent limitations in the
power of judicial review. When a court frequently issues unfavorable rulings against those in power, it may start losing legitimacy
or the functional benefits of having an independent court may
pale in comparison with their costs. As Professor Shapiro has put
it, there exists a tension between judicial lawmaking and judicial
independence.79 When judges make law, as inevitably happens in
the interpretation of often ambiguous constitutional provisions,
they invite attacks on their independence.
This Part explores four explanations for why courts may have
limited power to enforce constitutional rights. Specifically, it suggests that: (1) courts may face court-curbing measures; (2) courts
employ various doctrinal tools to avoid conflict with the political
branches; (3) courts issue decisions largely in line with majoritarian preferences to avoid high-profile clashes with the political
branches; and (4) courts are institutionally ill equipped to deal
with certain types of rights violations, such as torture and social
rights.
A.

Court Curbing

When a court is consistently out of step with political coalitions, political actors may retaliate against the court. Such
measures are commonly referred to as “court curbing”—that is,
“actual changes to the Court’s institutional power—through jurisdiction stripping, court packing, or other legislative means.”80
Such measures can be passed through constitutional reform, legislative measures, or the overturn of long-standing conventions.81
Regardless of the form, their goal is to limit courts’ powers.
Although some have speculated that court-curbing measures
are rare because courts will act strategically to avoid them, there
79 See Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis 34 (Chicago 1981)
(noting that “lawmaking and judicial independence are fundamentally incompatible”).
80 Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy,
53 Am J Polit Sci 971, 972 (2009).
81 See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 UC Davis L Rev 189, 195–215
(2013) (describing the phenomenon of “abusive constitutionalism,” whereby the tools of
constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement are used for undemocratic
means, including court curbing).
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are numerous real-world cases. Perhaps the most famous example is President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s court-packing plan. When
the US Supreme Court repeatedly struck down legislation during
the 1930s, Roosevelt responded with a plan to alter the composition of the court.82 While Roosevelt’s proposal never came to pass,
Arizona and Georgia successfully packed their highest courts recently. Exploiting the fact that their state constitutions do not
specify how many judges should be on the state supreme court,
Republican-controlled legislatures successfully increased the
number of judges on their respective supreme courts.83
There are many more recent examples. For instance, the
Hungarian Constitutional Court, which struck down roughly onethird of all legislation it reviewed between 1990 and 1995,84 witnessed a range of court-curbing measures after the opposition party
gained over two-thirds of the seats in the parliament in 2010.85 The
government curbed the court’s power in three ways: (1) by amending
the process for nominating constitutional judges as to remove veto
power from the opposition parties; (2) by excluding from its jurisdiction many fiscal matters; and (3) by significantly expanding the
size of the court, thus allowing Fidesz to appoint rubber-stamp
82 This episode famously ended with Justice Owen Roberts’s “switch in time” in response to Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan. For a brief history of the Court-packing scheme
and an analysis the Court’s response, see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court,
80 Va L Rev 201, 208–29 (1994).
83 In May 2016, Arizona Governor Doug Ducey, a Republican, signed into law a bill
that expanded the Arizona Supreme Court from five to seven members. Arizona’s chief
justice objected to the bill, as did Democrats in the state legislature, who accused Ducey
and the Republicans of court packing. See Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, ‘Like Blackmail’: Judiciary Gets Money Only If Supreme Court Expands (Ariz Republic, Apr 28, 2016), archived
at http://perma.cc/SXA7-XZ4R (quoting a Democratic state representative as saying that
“[t]here’s absolutely no caseload reason to add Supreme Court judges, the only reason to
do it is so the governor can stack the Supreme Court with his picks”); Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez, Gov. Doug Ducey Signs Legislation to Expand Arizona Supreme Court (Ariz
Republic, May 18, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/58MR-ZQVF. The same story played
out in Georgia that year, where the Republican-controlled state legislature passed a bill that
expanded the Georgia Supreme Court from seven to nine members. Georgia Republicans
offered the same rationale as their Arizona counterparts—an ability to handle an enlarged
caseload in a growing state—and Democrats in the state also accused the GOP of court
packing. See Kristina Torres, Expansion of Georgia’s Supreme Court Wins Final Approval
(Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Mar 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/X986-TXRU.
Similar efforts have been made in Florida, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Iowa. See
Russell Berman, Arizona Republicans Try to Bring Back Court-Packing (The Atlantic,
May 10, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/AG7F-KXDR.
84 Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary. Or, Why Courts Can Be More Democratic than Parliaments, in Adam Czarnota, Martin Krygier, and Wojciech Sadurski, eds,
Rethinking the Rule of Law after Communism 25, 44 (CEU 2005).
85 See Gardbaum 53 Colum J Transnatl L at 295–96 (cited in note 2).
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judges.86 It further abolished the actio popularis, which had allowed all citizens to bring a case to court, regardless of whether
they were personally affected by the challenged laws or regulations.87 In the Hungarian case, most of these measures were
passed through a series of constitutional amendments and the
writing of a new constitution.88
In neighboring Poland, the right-wing Law and Justice Party
has successfully neutralized the country’s Constitutional Tribunal
by amending a series of ordinary laws that change how judges are
appointed.89 In Israel, after the supreme court rendered a series
of mostly unpopular decisions favoring rights over national security, it saw proposals to restrict its powers and to revise the procedures by which judges are appointed.90 Another recent example
is the Constitutional Court of Turkey. The Turkish court has long
been a staunch defender of the strong secular protections in the
Turkish constitution. To that end, it has banned political parties—including the two previous iterations of the ruling Justice
and Development Party91—and declared amendments to the constitution that would allow the wearing of the headscarf on university campuses to be unconstitutional.92 In response, the Turkish
government has resorted to constitutional reforms to alter the
power and composition of the court.93 More recently, in the wake
86 See Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, Disabling the Constitution, 23 J Democracy 138, 139–40 (July 2012).
87 Id at 142.
88 See Landau, 47 UC Davis L Rev at 208–10 (cited in note 81) (describing how the
Fidesz party in Hungary operated by employing a combination of constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement).
89 See Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Bruised, but Not Dead (Yet): The Polish Constitutional Court Has Spoken (Verfassungsblog, Dec 10, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/69KK-9PJM (describing a constitutional crisis in which the Polish parliament passed a series of laws affecting the selection of Constitutional Tribunal judges).
90 See Lis, Kulanu Balks at Likud Demand (cited in note 10) (describing recent
attempts by the Israeli government to reduce the supreme court’s power and change the
court’s appointment mechanism).
91 For an overview of the approach the Turkish Constitutional Court has taken on
party banning, see Landau, 47 UC Davis L Rev at 220–24 (cited in note 81). See also Aslı
Ü. Bâli, The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and the Turkish
Example, 52 Va J Intl L 235, 281 (2012) (noting the Turkish Constitutional Court’s past
efforts to dissolve pro-Islamic Parties).
92 See Yaniv Roznai and Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment—the Turkish Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10 Intl J Const L 175, 184–90 (2012) (describing the court’s headscarf
decisions).
93 See Bâli, 52 Va J Intl L at 295–309 (cited in note 91) (describing these reforms and
arguing that they do not amount to court packing but rather liberalized the composition
of the court).
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of a failed coup attempt, the country has witnessed an all-out
assault on judicial independence, and the imprisonment of many
judges, including two members of the constitutional court.94
While court curbing might take different forms, in many of
these cases political branches retaliated against courts after periods of sustained judicial activism, whereby popular majorities resist judicially imposed constraints on their power. While we lack
a systematic record of all attempts at court curbing, these recent
attacks on high-profile courts in new democracies suggest that
courts that stand in the way of the political branches may have
their wings clipped.
B.

Judicial Self-Restraint

Courts also have ways to steer clear of high-profile political
confrontations in the first place. First, they can employ avoidance
doctrines, such as “passive virtues” in the United States95 and the
“margin of appreciation” doctrine developed by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which allow them to avoid
highly charged political questions.96 Second, courts can delay the
application of their decisions through the use of deferral techniques to avoid direct clashes with the political branches.97 This
technique is commonly used by courts in many countries.98 In our
case study on religious freedom in Russia, we found that one of
the biggest victories for religious groups came when the constitutional court denied retroactive application of a law that would

94 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Turkey: Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws Nos. 667–676 Adopted following the Failed Coup of 15 July 2016 ¶ 147
at *32 (Dec 12, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/A6MT-VSS9 (discussing the purge of the
judiciary).
95 See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword:
The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv L Rev 40 (1961) (describing the judicial tools available to the
Supreme Court that enable it to “withhold[ ] ultimate constitutional adjudication”).
96 For a description of the margin-of-appreciation doctrine and its use by the ECtHR,
see Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective,
66 Duke L J 1, 34–43 (2016).
97 See Rosalind Dixon and Samuel Issacharoff, Living to Fight Another Day: Judicial
Deferral in Defense of Democracy, 2016 Wis L Rev 683, 699 (describing the strategy of
deferred judicial review as a means for the court to avoid direct political confrontations).
98 See Roznai and Yolcu, 10 Intl J Const L at 180–81 (cited in note 92) (noting that
“interpretation in conformity with the Constitution,” whereby disputed laws are not ruled
unconstitutional but nonetheless contrary to law, has “frequently been applied by German,
French, and Italian constitutional courts”); Dixon and Issacharoff, 2016 Wis L Rev at 696–
722 (cited in note 97) (describing deferral techniques used by the courts of Canada,
Colombia, Germany, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and the United States).
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otherwise have revoked the registration of new religious groups.99
In this case, the Constitutional Court of Russia did not declare
the law to be unconstitutional, but rather interpreted it to neutralize its most harmful effects. In the same vein, Professors
Yonatan Lupu, Pierre Verdier, and Mila Versteeg show that national courts are more successful in enforcing the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) when they interpret domestic laws in line with the ICCPR than when they strike
these laws entirely, exactly because the former allows courts to
avoid high-profile political confrontations.100
These various forms of self-restraint may allow courts to
build legitimacy so that they can occasionally spend their political
capital on a particularly egregious violation. In some cases, such
self-restraint is built into the constitution. Professor Stephen
Gardbaum argued in favor of “weak-form” judicial review, such as
the notwithstanding mechanism in Canada, whereby the legislature has the ability to override judicial rulings.101 According to
Gardbaum, weak-form judicial review produces fruitful dialogue
between the political and judicial branches, but ultimately leaves
the final word on the constitution to the political branches,
thereby preserving the long-term independence of the courts.102
He suggests that such weak forms are particularly desirable in
new democracies that do not have a long tradition of judicial
independence. Professor Mark Tushnet has similarly suggested
that weak forms of judicial review are desirable in the enforcement of social rights, which is inherently more political in nature.103 In these cases, constitutional designers shelter courts
from high-profile clashes with the political branches by giving the
political branches the final say on the constitution.
While these various techniques can ensure the independence
of courts in the longer run, their usage implies that courts, in

99

See Chilton, Smirnova, and Versteeg, Constitutional Rights in Action (cited in note 21).
See Yonatan Lupu, Pierre-Hugues Verdier, and Mila Versteeg, The Strength of
Weak Review: National Courts, Interpretive Canons, and Human Rights Treaties *25–30
(unpublished manuscript, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/KV6B-PCGG.
101 See Gardbaum, 53 Colum J Transnatl L at 289–90, 292–93 (cited in note 2);
Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and
Practice 25–30 (Cambridge 2013).
102 Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism at 26–27 (cited
in note 101).
103 See Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law 227–28, 263–64 (Princeton 2008).
100
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many cases, will steer clear from rendering high-profile decisions
that enforce constitutional rights.
C.

The Majoritarian Character of Courts

Instead of employing doctrinal tools to avoid certain questions, courts can also decide to issue rulings that are largely in
line with the preferences of the political branches. Indeed, a large
body of research implies that courts alter their behavior strategically in response to their broader political environment.104 Scholars of the US Supreme Court have long observed that the Court
rarely issues decisions that are truly countermajoritarian in nature. As early as the 1950s, Professor Robert Dahl observed that
“the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of
line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”105 Although the justices themselves
commonly claim that popular opinion should not affect judicial
interpretation,106 many have observed that judicial decisionmaking tends to align with political preferences at the national
level.107 Importantly, if judicial decisions reflect the preferences of
popular majorities, we should not expect them to issue decisions
about constitutional rights that are truly countermajoritarian in
nature. By contrast, they may be more likely to rule against a
small group that attempts to repress large parts of the population. This, indeed, was exactly James Madison’s insight when he
suggested bills of rights are better suited to protect against the
problem of minorities taking advantage of the majority108 than
against rights violations by majorities against minorities.109

104

See generally Tom S. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Independence (Cambridge 2011).
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J Pub L 279, 285 (1957).
106 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 999–
1000 (1992) (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“How upsetting it is, that
so many of our citizens . . . think that we Justices should properly take into account their
views, as though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining
some kind of social consensus.”); William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public
Opinion, 20 Suffolk U L Rev 751, 752 (1986).
107 See Dahl, 6 J Pub L at 293 (cited in note 105); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore
through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 Cal L Rev 1721, 1750 (2001) (“On only a
relative handful of occasions has the Court interpreted the Constitution in ways opposed
by a clear majority of the nation.”).
108 See Federalist 10 (Madison), in The Federalist 56, 60–61 (cited in note 33).
109 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct 17, 1788), in Jack N.
Rakove, ed, Declaring Rights: A Brief History with Documents 160, 161 (Bedford 1998)
(noting that “experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its
105
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There are different explanations for why court rulings are often majoritarian in nature. One is the possibility of court curbing.
A body of political science literature has postulated “that periods
of Court curbing are followed by marked periods of judicial deference to legislative preferences.”110 Indeed, Roosevelt’s courtpacking plan famously produced Justice Owen Roberts’s “switch
in time” and brought the Supreme Court in line with popular preferences.111 Building on this insight, Professors Lee Epstein, Jack
Knight, and Olga Shvetsova suggest that courts should stay
within the “tolerance intervals” of the political branches in order
to avoid attacks on their independence.112 Over time, the size of
the tolerance intervals might increase as the court builds legitimacy; until then, courts are better off staying within the “safe areas, or else they will face political backlash.113 Epstein, Knight,
and Shvetsova illustrate this point by analyzing the case law of
the ill-fated first Russian constitutional court, which was suspended by President Yeltsin in 1993, a mere two years after its
inception. They show that this court decided a number of highly
charged political disputes before it had built up a reservoir of good
will, and offer this as an explanation for its early demise.114
A second explanation for why courts rule in line with popular
preferences is the knowledge that unpopular decisions might be
overturned or simply remain unimplemented. Scholars of the US
Supreme Court have theorized that when judicial decisions can
be overturned through legislation, courts will pick their preferred
policy from those policy options that are unlikely to be overturned.115 Presumably, the same logic applies to constitutional
amendments, whereby courts try to avoid decisions that will
likely result in constitutional amendments, especially in those
countries for which constitutions are relatively easy to amend.
For example, when the Indian Supreme Court struck down land
reform laws in the name of private property in the 1960s and
1970s, it saw relentless pressure from the legislature, which kept

controul is most needed” and that “[r]epeated violations of these parchment barriers have
been committed by overbearing majorities in every State”).
110 Clark, 53 Am J Polit Sci at 972 (cited in note 80).
111 See Cushman, 80 Va L Rev at 209 (cited in note 82) (describing the Court-packing
scheme and the Court’s response).
112 See Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova, 35 L & Society Rev at 127–31 (cited in note 5).
113 See id.
114 See id at 136–54.
115 See Clark, 53 Am J Polit Sci at 972 (cited in note 80); Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J.
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited 326–28 (Cambridge 2002).
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overturning the court’s decisions through constitutional amendment, until the court switched its position.116 In the German context, Professor Georg Vanberg has found that German judges take
the policy preferences of political actors into account, because
“they must often rely on legislative majorities to abide by, and
sometimes even to carry out, their decisions.”117
Finally, courts may rule in line with political branches because they share the preferences of those who appointed them.
That is, even when courts are fully independent, judges are typically appointed and confirmed by the political branches, who
often appoint judges who share their preferences. This likely has
a moderating effect on courts’ desire to stand up against the political branches, especially as long as the party that appointed
them remains in power. What is more, in a context in which courts
are not independent, courts can simply become agents of the executive. To illustrate, the Venezuelan Supreme Court recently issued a ruling that assigned the congress’s power to the court itself, thereby effectively stifling opposition against the
executive.118 In this scenario, we can no longer view the court as
enforcing majoritarian preferences (the congress, after all, was
democratically elected); rather, it is acting as an agent of the executive that appointed the court. While our analysis in this Essay
focuses on courts that are considered to be independent, it is
worth observing that, in many parts of the world, courts lack independence entirely.
D. Institutional Limitations
Courts are also institutionally ill equipped to deal with certain types of rights violations. Importantly, courts are unable to
continuously monitor behavior, and instead depend on certain

116 See Manjoj Mate, Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the
Supreme Court of India, in Kapiszweski, Silverstein, and Kagan, eds, Consequential
Courts 262, 265–70 (cited in note 4). In the aftermath, the court positioned itself as a champion of the people, and dramatically expanded access to the court. The Indian Supreme Court
appears to have encountered very little backlash, perhaps because its decisions tend to
vindicate the preferences of popular majorities. See id at 270–80.
117 Georg Vanberg, The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany 170
(Cambridge 2005).
118 See Andrew Rosati, Venezuela Lurches toward Dictatorship as Top Court Seizes
Power (Bloomberg, Mar 30, 2017), online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-03-30/venezuela-s-supreme-court-takes-over-national-assembly-duties (visited Oct 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
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cases to reach the court. One type of rights violation that is unlikely to reach the court is torture. Torture tends to take place in
secret, behind closed doors, and in violation of existing legal norms.
Although there are occasional attempts to create a legal space for
torture—as in the infamous US torture memos119—torture is usually an extralegal affair.120 Thus, constitutional courts are unlikely to be presented with laws or regulations that legalize torture and can be struck down. Moreover, the lack of information
on torture further hurts courts’ ability to award individual remedies for torture victims.121 The prohibition of torture, therefore,
might be particularly hard to enforce.
Some have suggested that courts are also institutionally ill
equipped to enforce social rights, such as the right to education
or the right to healthcare.122 Enforcing these rights requires
courts to make decisions that are essentially political in nature,
as they involve the allocation of scarce funds.123 Courts have
found various ways around such limitations. The South African
Constitutional Court famously defers to the political branches
when it comes to social rights; it merely requires the government
to have a reasonable policy in place without dictating the substance
of this policy.124 Many other courts have focused relief for individual
119 The memoranda drafted by the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel in
support of the CIA’s interrogation program can be found in David Cole, ed, The Torture
Memos: Rationalizing the Unthinkable (New Press 2009).
120 See Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White
House 248 (Oxford 2010) (discussing William Blackstone, who famously observed that the
use of the rack in Tudor times was used “as an engine of state” but “not of law”).
121 See Yonatan Lupu, Best Evidence: The Role of Information in Domestic Judicial
Enforcement of International Human Rights Agreements, 67 Intl Org 469, 477–79 (2013)
(noting that courts have difficulty enforcing violations of personal-integrity rights, such as
torture, because such violations often occur in situations in which the government can
easily hide or destroy evidence).
122 See Helen Hershkoff, Transforming Legal Theory in the Light of Practice: The Judicial Application of Social and Economic Rights to Private Orderings, in Varun Gauri
and Daniel M. Brinks, eds, Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and
Economic Rights in the Developing World 268, 268–69 (Cambridge 2008).
123 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa
*13–14 (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No 124, Mar 7, 2001), archived at
http://perma.cc/RD7N-U8M9.
124 For an example of the South African Constitutional Court applying this approach,
see Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom, [2001] 1 S Afr 46, 86 at
¶¶ 93–96 (CC). The South African Constitutional Court’s approach has been celebrated by
scholars. See Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 221–29
(Oxford 2001); Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights at 242–47 (cited in note 103). This
approach, however, appears to be confined to South Africa and has not been widely followed by other courts. See Landau, 53 Harv Intl L J at 199 (cited in note 60) (noting that
the South African approach has “not been used anywhere else”).
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plaintiffs, without ordering systematic remedies that would affect
larger groups of people.125 The Colombian Constitutional Court’s
tutelas that have ordered the government to pay for individual’s
health treatments, pensions, or provide other subsidies, fit this
“individualized enforcement” model.126 Finally, some courts have
interpreted social rights as a nonretrogression principle, meaning
that they have stricken austerity measures and other rules and
regulations that reduce social benefits.127 Such “negative injunctions” have been employed in Brazil, Hungary, and Argentina,
among other countries.128 The flipside of these various approaches
is that courts have only very rarely ordered system-wide reforms
to transform social justice. What is more, some studies have observed that the individualized enforcement model, which is the
most common in many countries, might come at the expense of
social mobilization.129 Rather than organizing and mobilizing to
persuade the government to provide social rights, individuals
might simply go to court to ensure the delivery of certain services
to themselves. If social mobilization is indeed the key to rights
enforcement, as we suggest elsewhere, then judicial enforcement
could hamper the implementation of social rights.130
CONCLUSION
The data we presented suggest that constitutional courts are
less impactful than is commonly believed. Of course, our findings
leave many questions unanswered. Probably the most pressing
among them is: If not primarily through constitutional courts,
how should we enforce constitutional rights?
We have argued elsewhere that constitutional-rights provisions need to be self-enforcing to be effective. That is, they need
to be supplemented by protective constituencies that have a stake

125 See Landau, 53 Harv Intl L J at 192, 230–32 (cited in note 60) (describing the
“individualized model” whereby “courts give a single remedy to a single plaintiff for provision of a treatment, pension, or subsidy, but tend to deny systematic remedies that would
affect larger groups”).
126 See id at 205–16 (describing the aggressive use of tutelas—“complaints allowing
citizens harmed by government . . . actions in violation of their constitutional rights to
bring a suit”—in the Colombian legal system).
127 See id at 232–35.
128 See id at 233–34.
129 See Landau, 53 Harv Intl L J at 201–03 (cited in note 60).
130 We develop this point further in our book manuscript. See generally Chilton and
Versteeg, From Parchment to Barriers (cited in note 21).
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in preserving these rights and that can make it costly for a government to violate rights.131 Such protective constituencies include trade unions, organized religion, and political parties. For
such groups, litigation is an important tool, but not the only one.
They can also organize protests, mobilize the political opposition,
organize petitions, educate the public, and engage in acts of civil
disobedience.
Indeed, one possibility raised by our analysis is that the enforcement of judicial decisions itself depends on the existence of
protective constituencies. There is some support for this conjecture
in the literature. For example, scholars of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights have observed that the court’s rulings are
more likely to be implemented when there are groups that mobilize for their implementation.132 Similarly, it has been observed
that the South African Constitutional Court’s famous Republic of
South Africa v Grootboom133 decision on the right to housing was
never fully implemented, while its Minister of Health v Treatment
Action Campaign134 decision on antiviral HIV/AIDS drugs did get
implemented. This difference has been attributed to the fact that
there were no committed groups to follow up on the Grootboom
decision, while the Treatment Action Campaign, an NGO committed to provision of HIV/AIDS medication, did push for implementation and created a broader social movement around the decision.135
The existence of civil-society groups that push for implementation, then, might be key to courts’ effectively enforcing the constitution. There are other possible factors that could impact the
extent to which judicial enforcement of constitutional rights is effective. It is possible that some subset of courts may be better able
131 See Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political
Change, 45 World Polit 595, 598–600 (1993) (describing the effect of policy feedback on the
formation of interest groups).
132 See James L. Cavallaro and Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court,
102 Am J Intl L 768, 770 (2008).
133 [2001] 1 S Afr 46 (CC).
134 [2002] 5 S Afr 721 (CC).
135 See Kameshni Pillay, Implementation of Grootboom: Implication for the Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 6 L Democracy & Development 255, 274–76 (2002) (describing the difference in outcome in Grootboom and Treatment Action Campaign); Brian
Ray, Engaging with Social Rights: Procedure, Participation, and Democracy in South
Africa’s Second Wave 59 (Cambridge 2016); Malcolm Langford, Housing Rights Litigation:
Grootboom and Beyond, in Malcolm Langford, et al, eds, Socio-economic Rights in South
Africa: Symbols or Substance? 187, 204–05 (Cambridge 2014) (“The greater post-judgment
outcomes in the TAC case . . . [are] said to be attributed to the primacy of social movements
in [that] case.”).
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to protect rights—for example, those situated in long-standing democracies or countries with respect for the rule of law. One important task for future research is to discover under what conditions independent courts are most impactful and the possible
drivers of their success.
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APPENDIX
Our primary statistical analysis uses the three-step research
design depicted in Figure A.136 In Step 1, we first calculate the
probability a country would have a specific right within its constitution. To do so, we use a matrix of eighty-seven possible constitutional rights to calculate a constitutional “ideal point” for
each country in each year. We then are able to calculate the probability a country would have a given constitutional right.
In Step 2, we match country-year observations that have a
given constitutional right to other country-year observations that
do not have the specific right. Our matching algorithm uses the
ideal point estimates from Step 1, along with the “standard” variables used in the human-rights literature.
In Step 3, we run regressions on the matched datasets. These
regressions include variables for whether a country has a given
constitutional right and all of the variables included in the matching process. We also include an interaction term between the variables “Constitutional Right” and “Constitutional Court.” This is
our variable of interest.
FIGURE A. THREE-STEP RESEARCH DESIGN

This Appendix presents three versions of our results. In
Section A, we present the results using the process described
above. In Section B, we present results without preprocessing our
data with matching (in other words, we skip Step 2). In Section C,

136 This research design is fully described in Chilton and Versteeg, 44 J Legal Stud at
431–34 (cited in note 21). It is based on a design used to study the effectiveness of humanrights treaties introduced in Yonatan Lupu, The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment: Using the Spatial Model to Address Selection Effects, 57 Am J Polit Sci 912 (2013).
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we present results without preprocessing our data with matching
while also including country fixed effects. Although we find a positive and statistically significant interaction effect in a couple of
specifications, this is not consistent across specifications for a single right. In other words, we do not find consistent evidence that
an independent judiciary, equipped with the power of judicial review, is able to strengthen the enforcement of constitutional
rights.
A.

Baseline Results
Organizational Rights
Unionization

Political Parties

Religion

Constitutional Right

0.815***

0.652***

1.080**
(0.423)

Constitutional Court

0.148
(0.831)

–0.370
(0.616)

—

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

–0.405
(0.941)

0.386
(0.709)

0.962
(0.632)

Probability of Right

–0.605*
(0.341)

0.558
(0.347)

0.056
(0.923)

Polity

0.124***
(0.341)

0.263***
(0.035)

0.052
(0.047)

GDP per Capita (ln)

0.223*
(0.134)

0.223
(0.146)

–0.267
(0.254)

Population (ln)

–0.270***
(0.087)

0.062
(0.085)

–0.331***
(0.112)

Interstate War

–0.127
(0.489)

–0.446
(0.379)

0.156
(0.386)

Civil War

0.282
(0.468)

–0.499
(0.468)

–0.379
(0.672)

Civil Society

3.023***
(0.809)

2.901***
(0.540)

3.276***
(1.212)

Regime Durability

0.008*
(0.004)

0.014***
(0.006)

0.014*
(0.008)

Youth Bulge

–0.014
(0.022)

–0.008
(0.030)

–0.056
(0.044)

Observations

1,426

1,390

482

(0.252)

(0.244)

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant and year fixed effects; however, we
omit them from the table. A variable is omitted because it is collinear with the interactional between Constitutional Court and Constitutional Right.
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Individual Rights
Gender
Equality

Torture

Expression

Movement

0.236
(0.537)

0.252
(0.344)

Constitutional Right

–0.781
(1.046)

–0.288*

Constitutional Court

–1.721
(2.681)

–0.247
(0.238)

—

13.946***
(0.913)

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

–1.761
(3.034)

0.481
(0.293)

–1.603
(2.114)

–13.066***
(1.090)

Probability of Right

4.260***
(1.591)

–0.114
(0.168)

–0.198
(1.059)

0.493
(0.380)

Polity

0.357***
(0.108)

0.028*
(0.016)

0.151
(0.097)

0.224***
(0.048)

GDP per Capita (ln)

–0.445
(0.637)

0.197**
(0.076)

–0.025
(0.273)

0.678***
(0.176)

Population (ln)

–0.792
(0.501)

–0.239***
(0.061)

–0.085
(0.209)

–0.766***
(0.126)

Interstate War

0.320
(1.164)

–1.009***
(0.192)

0.453
(0.677)

–0.574
(0.419)

Civil War

–1.054
(1.281)

–0.472***
(0.171)

–0.445
(0.479)

0.409
(0.666)

Civil Society

0.442
(2.230)

1.429***
(0.335)

4.236***
(1.165)

0.199
(0.976)

Regime Durability

0.016
(0.018)

0.007**
(0.003)

0.007
(0.014)

–0.010
(0.007)

Youth Bulge

–0.604***
(0.133)

–0.048***
(0.015)

–0.119*
(0.063)

0.060*
(0.032)

Observations

954

1,126

204

812

(0.160)

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant and year fixed effects; however, we
omit them from the table. A variable is omitted because it is collinear with the interactional between Constitutional Court and Constitutional Right.
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Socioeconomic Rights
Education
Healthcare
Constitutional Right

–0.002
(0.113)

–0.026
(0.065)

Constitutional Court

–0.125
(0.250)

0.352
(0.564)

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

0.007
(0.325)

–0.465
(0.560)

Probability of Right

–0.075
(0.112)

–0.004
(0.098)

Polity

0.026***
(0.009)

0.011
(0.007)

GDP per Capita (ln)

0.189***
(0.069)

0.107
(0.074)

Interstate War

0.330
(0.234)

–0.197
(0.125)

Civil War

–0.837
(0.575)

–0.005
(0.123)

Urban Population

–0.008***
(0.003)

–0.001
(0.002)

Population over 65

–0.010
(0.013)

0.037**
(0.015)

Inflation

–0.002***
(0.001)

–0.000***
(0.000)

GDP Growth

–0.029***
(0.010)

–0.011***
(0.003)

Spending t–1

0.899***
(0.031)

0.833***
(0.075)

Observations

188

472

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant and year fixed effects; however, we
omit them from the table.
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Without Matching
Organizational Rights
Unionization

Political Parties

Religion

Constitutional Right

0.919***
(0.276)

0.431**

(0.201)

1.383***
(0.459)

Constitutional Court

0.880*

(0.462)

0.515**
(0.254)

–0.719
(0.619)

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

–0.501
(0.490)

–0.048
(0.312)

1.460**
(0.648)

Probability of Right

–0.409
(0.306)

0.236
(0.253)

–0.800
(0.834)

Polity

0.090***
(0.020)

0.229***
(0.022)

0.066***
(0.022)

GDP per Capita (ln)

0.036
(0.095)

0.177*
(0.090)

0.091
(0.095)

Population (ln)

–0.176***
(0.058)

–0.018
(0.049)

–0.269***
(0.057)

Interstate War

–0.230
(0.332)

–0.143
(0.272)

0.031
(0.268)

Civil War

–0.239
(0.301)

–0.552
(0.497)

–0.577*
(0.350)

Civil Society

3.065***
(0.471)

2.572***
(0.472)

3.146***
(0.458)

Regime Durability

0.003
(0.004)

0.012***
(0.003)

0.009***
(0.003)

Youth Bulge

–0.038***
(0.014)

–0.003
(0.016)

0.059***
(0.016)

Observations

4,763

4,763

5,309

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant and year fixed effects; however, we
omit them from the table.
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Individual Rights
Gender
Equality

Torture

Expression

Movement

Constitutional Right

–0.498
(1.024)

–0.394**
(0.166)

–0.042
(0.324)

–0.038
(0.350)

Constitutional Court

–2.230
(1.484)

–0.263
(0.225)

–1.521
(0.928)

0.405
(0.726)

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

1.230
(1.641)

0.537**
(0.226)

1.874**
(0.947)

–0.029
(0.767)

Probability of Right

3.830***
(1.215)

–0.098
(0.163)

0.198
(0.614)

0.178
(0.341)

Polity

0.251***
(0.094)

0.007
(0.011)

0.138***
(0.018)

0.132***
(0.025)

GDP per Capita (ln)

0.108
(0.521)

0.329***
(0.059)

0.271***
(0.084)

0.414***
(0.138)

Population (ln)

–0.679**
(0.331)

–0.146***
(0.031)

–0.120**
(0.051)

–0.184**
(0.072)

Interstate War

–0.168
(0.838)

–1.031***
(0.145)

0.082
(0.190)

–0.521*
(0.295)

Civil War

–1.560*
(0.911)

–0.540***
(0.130)

–0.434
(0.361)

–0.231
(0.513)

Civil Society

0.547
(2.102)

1.493***
(0.240)

3.575***
(0.426)

1.225**
(0.517)

Regime Durability

0.025**
(0.012)

0.007***
(0.003)

0.006
(0.004)

0.006
(0.005)

Youth Bulge

–0.437***
(0.080)

–0.016**
(0.008)

0.011
(0.015)

0.017
(0.016)

Observations

2,679

5,255

4,763

5,315

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant and year fixed effects; however, we
omit them from the table.
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Socioeconomic Rights
Education
Healthcare
Constitutional Right

0.069
(0.058)

0.006
(0.038)

Constitutional Court

0.036
(0.065)

0.010
(0.052)

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

–0.065
(0.068)

0.065
(0.071)

Probability of Right

–0.046
(0.044)

–0.076*
(0.041)

Polity

0.001
(0.003)

0.003
(0.002)

GDP per Capita (ln)

0.058**
(0.028)

0.016
(0.023)

Interstate War

–0.007
(0.061)

–0.028
(0.050)

Civil War

–0.074
(0.082)

–0.060
(0.046)

Urban Population

–0.001
(0.001)

–0.001
(0.001)

Population over 65

–0.003
(0.004)

0.016***
(0.004)

Inflation

–0.000*
(0.000)

–0.000**
(0.000)

GDP Growth

–0.009**
(0.004)

–0.012***
(0.004)

Spending t–1

0.946***
(0.013)

0.937***
(0.020)

Observations

1,967

2,885

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant and year fixed effects; however, we
omit them from the table.
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Without Matching + Country Fixed Effects
Organizational Rights
Unionization

Political Parties

Religion

Constitutional Right

0.287***
(0.083)

0.092
(0.057)

0.550***
(0.132)

Constitutional Court

0.230***
(0.087)

0.156***
(0.059)

0.013
(0.147)

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

–0.096
(0.104)

0.002
(0.078)

0.170
(0.152)

Probability of Right

0.175*
(0.103)

0.229***
(0.061)

–0.429***
(0.116)

Polity

0.006
(0.007)

0.048***
(0.005)

0.016***
(0.006)

GDP per Capita (ln)

–0.002
(0.024)

0.024
(0.025)

–0.011
(0.024)

Population (ln)

–0.018*
(0.010)

0.009
(0.012)

0.010
(0.009)

Interstate War

0.026
(0.073)

–0.102
(0.062)

–0.015
(0.079)

Civil War

0.009
(0.063)

–0.041
(0.072)

0.087
(0.095)

Civil Society

0.579***
(0.148)

0.404***
(0.099)

0.485***
(0.124)

Regime Durability

–0.002
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

–0.000
(0.001)

Youth Bulge

0.004
(0.005)

0.001
(0.004)

–0.001
(0.004)

Observations

4,763

4,763

5,309

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant, year fixed effects, and country fixed
effects; however, we omit them from the table.
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Individual Rights
Gender
Equality

Torture

Expression

Movement

Constitutional Right

0.761
(0.595)

–0.230*
(0.133)

0.159
(0.169)

0.142
(0.172)

Constitutional Court

0.504
(0.513)

–0.032
(0.140)

0.095
(0.095)

0.150**
(0.075)

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

–0.317
(0.625)

0.264*
(0.157)

0.009
(0.104)

–0.067
(0.091)

Probability of Right

4.286***
(1.296)

0.163
(0.122)

0.016
(0.156)

–0.025
(0.135)

Polity

–0.016
(0.061)

0.021***
(0.008)

0.030***
(0.005)

0.016**
(0.007)

GDP per Capita (ln)

1.252**
(0.528)

0.025
(0.030)

0.014
(0.021)

0.031
(0.030)

Population (ln)

0.163
(0.328)

0.011
(0.014)

–0.003
(0.011)

–0.017
(0.015)

Interstate War

–0.809
(0.500)

–0.413***
(0.120)

–0.046
(0.047)

–0.125*
(0.075)

Civil War

–0.138
(0.506)

–0.104
(0.108)

–0.015
(0.063)

0.027
(0.143)

Civil Society

–1.692
(1.053)

0.623***
(0.157)

0.429***
(0.110)

0.256
(0.170)

Regime Durability

0.011
(0.023)

0.004***
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.002)

Youth Bulge

–0.058
(0.059)

–0.006
(0.006)

–0.004
(0.004)

–0.008
(0.005)

Observations

2,679

5,255

4,763

5,315

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant, year fixed effects, and country fixed
effects; however, we omit them from the table.
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Socioeconomic Rights
Education
Healthcare
Constitutional Right

0.144
(0.126)

0.460**
(0.215)

Constitutional Court

0.142
(0.134)

0.148
(0.113)

Constitutional Right x
Constitutional Court

–0.158
(0.138)

–0.030
(0.137)

Probability of Right

–0.148
(0.141)

–0.504
(0.309)

Polity

0.010
(0.007)

0.003
(0.008)

GDP per Capita (ln)

0.094*
(0.049)

0.040
(0.035)

Interstate War

0.113
(0.106)

0.038
(0.078)

Civil War

0.014
(0.099)

0.052
(0.092)

Urban Population

0.011
(0.007)

–0.000
(0.008)

Population over 65

–0.018
(0.019)

0.030
(0.027)

Inflation

–0.000***
(0.000)

–0.000
(0.000)

GDP Growth

–0.013***
(0.005)

–0.014***
(0.005)

Spending t–1

0.770***
(0.025)

0.644***
(0.060)

Observations

1,967

2,885

Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered by country
in parentheses. All specifications included a constant, year fixed effects, and country fixed
effects; however, we omit them from the table.

